Across The Fence: The Harmar Campaign along the Ohio River

In the years from 1784 to 1789, the Shawnee and Miami Indians of Kentucky routinely raided along the Ohio River and the settlements to the north. During those years, more than 1,500 settlers had been killed and yet no declaration of war was made nor was there an organized military defense mounted to stop the deadly raids.

Finally, in 1789, President George Washington contacted Arthur St. Clair, the governor of the Northwest Territory, (at that time the Northwest Territory of the U.S. was the northeastern portion of the continent) and inquired of him if he was of the opinion that the Indians along the Wabash and Illinois Rivers might desire peace with the United States or war. St. Clair advised the president that the tribes were inclined to war and advised that a force of militia be organized at Fort Washington (the present day site of Cincinnati) and additional troops be mustered in Vincennes, Ind.

St. Clair had commanded troops under Gen. Washington during the Revolution and was a friend and trusted adviser to the president. It appears that Washington, as St. Clair's friend, commander and president, supported St. Clair throughout his military and political career.

However, St. Clair was often a disappointment and embarrassment to Washington. In 1777, he was the commander of 3,000 troops at Fort Ticonderoga and surrendered the fort, without a fight, to an overwhelming number of British troops. For this action, St, Clair was court-martialed but was exonerated of any wrongdoing. The sentiment against St. Clair was strongly unfavorable. Fort Ticonderoga was considered to be impenetrable and it was generally believed that it could have been held. St. Clair argued that he had in fact saved 3,000 lives by abandoning the fort against a force of more than 8,000 British and allied Indians.

President Washington's trust in St. Clair's opinion was evident when he heeded the advice given by the governor. Washington along with Secretary of War Henry Knox approved the assembly of a militia and placed Gen. Josiah Harmar in command of the force on a punitive expedition into the lands of the Shawnee and Miami Indians. The purpose of the expedition was to punish the tribes for the depredations against white settlers since 1784 and by a show of force, prevent further attacks.

While the expeditions primary goal was the destruction of the Miami village at Kekionga (near present day Fort Wayne, Indiana) St. Clair and Harmar also recommended the building of fortifications at the confluence of the St. Mary and St, Joseph Rivers where they joined to form the Maumee River.

However, Washington did not approve the plan deeming the location to be too vulnerable and the potential expense too great. The Miami village was located near Fort Detroit, an American fort still occupied by British troops in defiance of the Treaty of Paris in 1783. Harmar sent a personal letter to the British commander at Fort Detroit to assure them that the military action was not against them but rather directed at the Indian tribes. Although it was known that the British continued to provide the tribes with supplies, Harmar expressed his 'confidence' that the British would not interfere.

Preparations for the expedition began in August but it was not until mid-October that the campaign began. Harmar had assembled 320 men from the regular Army of the First American Regiment along with more than 1,000 militiamen from Pennsylvania and Kentucky. Included in Harmar's armament were three six-pound canons. Although the expeditionary force was strong in numbers it lacked experience in terms of warfare and wilderness. There were few seasoned frontiersmen who participated in the campaign and most of the local citizens, who would have had the experience, paid recent immigrants to take their place. Lt. Ebenezer Denny of the regular Army wrote in his diary that the militia "... appear to be raw and unused to the gun or the woods." The inexperience would prove to be disastrous.

While Harmar was gathering troops around Fort Washington, a smaller army was being raised at Vincennes. Major Jean Francois Hamtramck had assembled nearly 300 men from Kentucky militia, some regular Army and other French-Canadian soldiers who had fought with him during the Revolution. His role in the expedition would be to march north from Vincennes and draw the Wabash Indians away from Harmar's troops. Hamtramck encountered only one abandoned Wabash village before running out of provisions and returned to Vincennes.

Preparations were completed by late September and the expedition launched its campaign, leaving Fort Washington, on Oct. 7 Those under Harmar's command included 180 militia with Col. John Hardin, a cavalry troop under Maj. James Fontaine and an addition 30 regulars under Capt. John Armstrong. It was of utmost importance that the campaign be completed before winter. The expedition included cattle for slaughter to feed the troops as well as horses for hauling canon and carrying cavalrymen. There were no pack trains and no provisions were brought to feed the livestock. Horses and cattle were dependent on grazing and would face starvation once winter set in and forage was unavailable.

On Oct. 14, Harmar and his troops were within 25 miles of the Miami village of Kekionga. Scouts from the Kentucky militia captured a Shawnee warrior who, under duress, revealed that the Shawnee and the Miami had combined forces at Kekionga and were prepared to meet Harmar's forces in battle. Harmar immediately dispatched Colonel Hardin with 600 men to make a forced march to Kekionga and mount a 'surprise' attack. When Hardin reached the village on the morning of October 15, he found the village abandoned. Hardin ordered what remained of the village to be burned.

Two days later, Harmar arrived at the smoldering remains of the village. The Miami Indians had evacuated the village and with the help of some British traders, had taken refuge at Fort Detroit. What arms and ammunition were available was given to the Miami and Shawnee by the British troops at the fort. Harmar continued the pursuit.

On Oct. 19, Harmar sent Hardin with a scouting party of 180 militia, a cavalry troop under Fontaine and 30 Army regulars under Armstrong to ascertain the strength of the Indian forces and to attack a nearby village of Chief Le Gris.

Before reaching the village they spotted a single horseback Indian who immediately took flight along a woodland trail leading away from the village. Under Hardin's orders the scouting party followed in pursuit and Fontaine's cavalry was sent back to bring back more troops. The lone Indian was of course a decoy and Hardin led his troops into a trap. Most of the militia fled warning Fontaine of the ambush and the regulars stood their ground. Twenty-two regulars and 40 militiamen were killed, only 20 men survived the attack. Armstrong hid in a nearby marsh and escaped undetected after the battle had ended. He blamed Hardin and the unreliable militia for the defeat.

The next day, Oct. 20, Harmar sent another detachment of 300 men under the command of Ensign Phillip Hartshorn, to scout for Indian activity. After a short march of eight miles, Hartshorn was ambushed by a large contingent of Indians and he along with 19 of his men were killed. Harmar did not advance his troops to counter the attack and instead withdrew several miles back along the path they had come. He even failed to send a later detail to bury the twenty dead but left them where they fell.

Enraged at Harmar's cowardice, Hardin demanded to be allowed at least 400 men to attack the Indians and bury their dead comrades. On the night of Oct. 21, Hardin took 300 militia and 60 regulars of the First American under the command of Maj. John P. Wyllys and found an encampment of more than 1,000 Indians near Kekionga. Hardin immediately sent a dispatch to Harmar for reinforcements. When Harmar was informed of the magnitude of the enemy forces he set up a defensive position with the 900 men still with him and did not send any reinforcements to Hardin.

Expecting reinforcements at any time, Hardin divided his forces into four separate groups in an attempt to flank the Indian forces. The maneuver proved fatal.

Under the command of Little Turtle, the Shawnee and Miami attacked and withdrew, drawing the soldiers into increasingly deadly traps. Maj. Wyllys' detachment was ambushed and defeated. Fontaine led his cavalry in a charge through a wooded area where he was ambushed. Hardin was surrounded and engaged the Indians in fierce battle for more than three hours.

The Shawnee named the engagement the Battle of Pumpkin Fields because the steam coming off the skulls of the scalped soldiers reminded them of squash steaming in the crisp autumn air. Casualties of regular Army and militia numbered 129 killed and 94 severely wounded. Fontaine and Wyllys were both killed in the battle.

This was the deadliest defeat of U.S. forces by Native Americans at that time, but the worst was yet to come.

Next week: The Battle of the Wabash.

M. Timothy Nolting is an award-winning Nebraska columnist and freelance writer. Contact Tim via email at [email protected]